The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple two-region, two-good, two-factor model, how an improvement in one region's import infrastructure can affect firms' location decisions and the nature of the trading equilibrium. It is shown that, through improvements in import infrastructure, one region might divert high-tech industries to another region. This effect reduces the incentive to improve import infrastructure.
Introduction
In the last decade the role of public infrastructure in regional economies, such as ports, railway networks, and new telecommunications networks, has been widely discussed. 1 It is increasingly recognized that the growing connectivity of individuals and organizations is achieved through improvements in the quality of public infrastructure which reduces transaction costs between regions, and a consequent increase in the flow of goods and services across regions. Related to this, competing new economic geography theories imply that regional integration might serve to greatly reduce regional inequalities. 2 In a recent influential contribution, Martin and Rogers (1995) proposed a new way to model various types of public infrastructure, which allows the analysis of its impact on trade patterns, industrial location, and welfare. They show that firms with increasing returns will tend to locate in the countries (or regions) with the best infrastructure in order to take advantage of economies of scale. In particular, they show that an improvement in domestic infrastructure in one country (or region) will imply a relocation of firms to this country (or region) (Martin and Rogers, 1995, p. 344 ). The intuition is that, as the quality of infrastructure improves, the transaction costs of goods produced and consumed in that country (or region) decrease, increasing the effective demand.
However, Martin and Rogers (1995) do not distinguish between export infrastructure and import infrastructure: an improvement in the quality of infrastructure implies a symmetric reduction in transaction costs for both exports and imports. This assumption is justified for simplification. However, infrastructure improvements often cause asymmetric reductions in transaction costs. For example, an improvement in the quality of a region's local transport networks affects the region's imports more than its exports. 3 Given these observations, the present study focuses on the role of import infrastructure in facilitating import transactions. The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple two-region, two-good (homogeneous good/differentiated high-tech products), two-factor (labor/capital) model, how an improvement in one region's import infrastructure can affect firms' location decisions and the nature of the trading equilibrium. In contrast to Martin and Rogers (1995) , it will be shown that, through improvements in import infrastructure, one region might divert high-tech industries to another region.
The main result of the current study, which captures the negative effect of the domestic infrastructure,
has not appeared in the existing literature.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the impact of an improvement in the quality of import infrastructure on the location of industries.
The Model
Suppose that there are two regions (Region 1 and Region 2), each with two factors (capital, K and labor, L ) and two types of goods (a homogeneous good and a large variety of differentiated high-tech products). Assume that the regions are identical in regard to tastes, size, and technology, but differ with respect to the costs of importing differentiated high-tech products. We assume these costs are directly related to the quality of import infrastructure.
It is important to note that the present model is a variant of Kikuchi (2005) . There are two main differences between the present setup and Kikuchi (2005)'s one: (1) the former labels two factors as capital and labor, while the latter labels those as skilled and unskilled labor; (2) the former assumes that the distribution of factor endowments is identical among regions, while the latter assumes that the distribution of factor endowments is different between countries. Although the assumption of the
where s is the degree of substitution among all products, i p is the producer prices for high-tech products produced in region i , and i n is the number of varieties produced in region i , respectively. Import costs ( 1) The homogeneous good is produced with constant returns, using only labor as an input. Units are chosen so that one unit of labor produces one unit of output. As usual in new geography models, no transport costs exist for the homogeneous good, which serves to tie down the wage rate. Also assume that the parameters of the model are such that both regions produce the homogeneous good; thus, constant, identical wages for labor hold (hereafter set to unity). Given that one unit of capital is required to develop a product, the payment for each unit of capital
where i x is the output of a representative firm in Region i . When capital mobility is unrestricted, the payment for capital will be equalized between regions, which implies that 1 2 r r = and thus (2) , (3) , and (4) into this condition yields the following equilibrium condition:
1 , Using (6) , (7) and (8) , the equilibrium share of Region 1 firms, 1 s can be obtained:
Equation (9) implies the surprising feature of infrastructure policies, which is highly contrasted with the result of Martin and Rogers (1995) (i.e., firms' relocation to the region with a better infrastructure).
Proposition: An improvement in the quality of import infrastructure in a region will induce a diversion of high-tech products away from that region. This result has important policy implications for regional economies. Improvements in import infrastructure in one region can divert firms in high-tech industries over to another region. This lowers the incentive to improve import infrastructure. Although better import infrastructure reduces import transaction costs, it also induces industrial diversion and raises the transaction costs of receiving products from those industries that relocate elsewhere. The possibility that industries will be diverted provides some theoretical grounds for the coordination of infrastructure investments among regional economies. Further research should focus on these policy implications. 
